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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
CaseNo.20010345-CA

vs.
SCOTT ALLEN WRIGHT,
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
L

BUT FOR TRIAL COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE AT
THE SENTENCING HEARING, WRIGHT WOULD HAVE
RECEIVED A MORE FAVORABLE SENTENCE

The State declined to address the first Strickland prong, asserting instead that
Wright was not prejudiced by his trial counsel's deficient performance at the sentencing
hearing (Br. of App. at 20). The State also claims that Wright's reliance on Wiggins v.
Smith, 123 S.Ct 2527,156 L.Ed.2d 471(2003), and Armstrong v. Bugger, 833 F.2d 1430
(1 lth Cir. 1987), are "substantially] distinguishable" because these are two capital
punishment cases, whereas Wright was convicted only with one count of operating a
clandestine laboratory (Br. of App. at 19, 21).
However, Wright again asserts that the facts in the present case are eerily similar
to Wiggins and Armstrong, the only material difference being that these two cases were in
fact capital punishment cases. In Wiggins, the United States Supreme Court found the
1

trial counsel's performance was deficient for not presenting the following mitigating
evidence at sentencing: Wiggins' mother frequently left Wiggins and his siblings home
alone for days, forcing them to beg for food and to eat paint chips and garbage; his
mother beat her children for breaking into the kitchen, which she often kept locked; she
had sex with men while her children slept in the same bed; she forced Wiggins' hand
against a hot stove burner; Wiggins' was placed in foster care when he was six years old;
Wiggins' first and second foster mothers physically abused him; his second foster father
molested and raped him; Wiggins ran away from home and lived on the streets at age
when sixteen years old; when he returned home one of his foster brother's allegedly gang
raped him; after leaving the foster care system he entered a Job Corps program and was
allegedly sexually abused by his supervisor, 123 S.Ct. at 2533. The Court concluded thai
the defendant was prejudiced by his counsel for not presenting this mitigating evidence
because he "has the kind of troubled history we have declared relevant to assessing a
defendant's moral culpability" and "had the jury been confronted with this considerable
mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a
different sentence." Id. at 2542.
The facts in Armstrong are also similar. Armstrong's trial counsel presented only
one mitigating witness, his parol officer. 833 F.2d. at 1432. However, trial counsel failed
to present the following mitigating evidence: Armstrong's history of nonviolence and
religious activities; the fact that he was raised in poverty and poor living conditions; his
hardworking nature and irregular school attendance due to the need to supplement his
family's income; that he had epileptic seizures, and that one expert considered him
2

mentally retarded and had organic brain damage. Id. at 1433-34. The 11th Circuit Court
concluded that the "demonstrated availability of undiscovered mitigating evidence clearly
met the prejudice requirement." Id. at 1434.
The United State Supreme Court observed in Wiggins that "In assessing prejudice,
we reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating
evidence/' because "evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant
because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts
that are attributable to a disadvantaged background ... may be less culpable than
defendants who have no such excuse." 123 S.Ct. at 2542 (citation omitted).
The sentencing judge must have "'the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics/ so that the punishment fits not only the crime, but
the defendant as well.'" United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 1971)
(quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L.Ed, 1337
(1949)). Moreover, due process "require[s] that a sentencing judge act on reasonably
reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." State v.
Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985).
The following is a conservative list of the mitigating evidence that was or should
have been presented to the trial court at the sentencing hearing: Wright had strong family
support evidenced by the three rows of people that showed up at his sentencing hearing
and the numerous number of letters in his behalf, making him a good candidate for
reform and likely to respond favorably to treatment (R. 175: 16); Wright was a hard and
honest worker (Defendant's Exhibit #3); Wright witnessed his mother's death when he
3

was five years old and believed he was the cause of her death - he was standing in the
vehicle and believes he distracted his mother while driving subsequently causing the
vehicle to roll several times (R. 316: 42); Wright was so shaken up by this tragedy that he
basically did nothing but sit on the couch by himself for a whole year and did not talk
with anyone (R. 316: 42-43); Wright suffered from physical and emotional abuse from an
alcoholic and drug abusing father (R. 316: 45-46); Wright lived in great fear during his
childhood due to his father's addictions and was repeatedly left alone with his sister while
his father was out drinking at night (R. 316: 45); and Wright had been sexually abused as
a child (R. 316: 51-54). Wright never received any counseling to help him cope with
losing his mother, to help him adjust to the physical and emotional abuse from his father,
or to help him cope with the sexual abuse (R. 316: 44). His trial counsel also failed to
adequately inform the judge of Wright's limited role in the crime he plead guilty to, and
failed to correct the judge's misunderstanding that children lived at the residence where
methamphetamine was being manufactured (R. 175: 22; 316: 7).
The State claims that these facts are more similar to Lovitt v. Warden, 585 S.E.2d
801 (Va. 2003), than to Wiggins ox Armstrong (Br. of App. at 28). However, Lovitt is
inapposite. Lovitt claimed that his trial counsel failed to investigate into his background
and family history. 585 S.E.2d at 820. The Virginia Court distinguished Wiggins, finding
that Lovitt's trial counsel presented "recent personal history as mitigation evidence"
which was "provided by four sheriffs deputies working at the Arlington jail," which
showed that he participated in Bible study, Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, and
voluntary work programs. Id. at 823. Trial counsel also presented family history
4

evidence through his stepsister. Id. The stepsister testified that Lovitt helped take care of
his brothers and sisters "because his stepfather was an alcoholic and 'wasn't allowed
around us most of the time.'" Id. At the habeas hearing, further testimony was given
stating that Lovitt was beaten by his stepfather. The stepfather also abuse alcohol and
drugs and allegedly molested Lovitt and the other children. Id. at 824.
However, the Virginia Court noted that Lovitt had a long history of drug abuse,
including the use of heroin, amphetamines, acid, and phencyclidine. 585 S.E.2d at 824.
The record also showed that Lovitt had a "serious problem with anger." Id. Juvenile
records further provided that his childhood home was "very clean and nicely furnished,"
and that he was provided a "stable home life" by his mother and stepfather. Id. These
records also described Lovitt as "physically aggressive" and "manipulative," and as
having assaulted other juveniles as a detention center. Id. Lovitt's criminal record also
contained numerous felonies "including attempted robbery, several burglaries and
larcenies, and drug violations." Id. at 825. In fact, he was on parole at the time he
murdered the victim in this case. Id.
The Court held that the evidence concerning Lovitt's "extensive drug abuse and
antisocial personality disorder" showed he was a "career criminal" that would be
unaffected by further attempts of rehabilitative services. 585 S.E.2d at 825. The Court
concluded that, based on all the evidence before it, Lovitt was not prejudiced by his trial
counsel's failure to further investigate and present the available mitigation evidence. Id.
Wright asserts that the facts in the present case are distinguishable from Lovitt.
Lovitt's trial counsel presented numerous witnesses at the sentencing hearing that
5

testified in behalf of Lovitt. 585 S.E.2d at 823. However, in this case, no witnesses
testified on Wright's behalf even though numerous people were available and willing to
testify in his behalf (R. 315: 20, 33). Moreover, in Lovitt, there was little mitigating
evidence to present - it mostly concerned the fact that his stepfather beat him. Id. at 824,
The vast majority of the evidence showed that Lovitt was a career criminal with a violent
history and that rehabilitation would not work. Id. at 825.
Wright's criminal record is not comparable to the defendant in Lovitt. Wright has
no history of violence, besides one domestic dispute occurring in 1994 (R. 173: 6).
Moreover, Wright's record consists mainly of juvenile offenses: a couple of shoplifting
charges, two marijuana possession charges, and a few fish/game violations (R. 173: 5).
His adult record shows that he did not have a drug charge for over ten years (R. 173: 6).
Wright asserts that if the sentencing judge heard all of the mitigating evidence concerning
his life history and his involvement in this crime, he would have received a more
favorable sentence.

II.

JUDGE BRIAN'S TESTIMONY AT THE RULE 23B HEARING IS
RELEVANT TO THIS ISSUE

The State argues that Judge Brian's testimony at the rule 23B hearing is irrelevant
and not helpful (Br. of App. at 33-34). While Judge Brian's testimony regarding whether
or not the mitigating evidence would have changed Wright's sentence is not dispositive.
Wright asserts that it certainly is relevant in determining whether he would have received
a more favorable outcome at the sentencing hearing.
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The State claims that Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 93 L.Ed.
1337 (1949), and United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1971) are not relevant
(Br. of App. at 35). However, these cases outline that fundamental fairness requires "a
sentencing judge to act on reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising
discretion in fixing a sentence." Howell, 707 P.2d at 118. When imposing a sentence, a
judge is required "to consider all of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
involved in the crime.5' Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 585, 79 S.Ct. 421, 427, 3
L.Ed.2d 516 (1959). Likewise, a "sentencing judge must have 'the fullest information
possible concerning the defendant's life and characteristics,' so that the punishment fits
not only the crime, but the defendant as well." United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030,
1038 (9th Cir. 1971) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. at 247)). Moreover, "A
trial court which fashions an inflexible practice in sentencing contradicts the judicially
approved policy in favor of individualizing sentences." Daniels, 446 F.2d at 971.
The record shows that Judge Brian adopted an inflexible sentencing practice when
he emphatically proclaimed, "it is my hope that this morning, the word goes out, if you
cook in this town and you come to my court you're going to prison" (R. 175: 24).
Although the State claims that Judge Brian "never expressed the view that defendant
himself was the actual methamphetamine cook or that he was personally involved in
selling drugs" (Br. of App. at 31), Judge Brian asserted at the rule 23B hearing that
Wright "was an active participant cooking methamphetamine with children in the home
in a neighborhood where people lived close by and he put the stuff in circulation for
people to buy and ruin their lives with" (R. 316: 7).
7

And although Judge Brian attempted to retract his statement and explain that not
everyone that "cooks" will go to prison, he stated that he believed Wright deserved "more
than 15 years" in the "state penitentiary for that crime" (R. 316: 34). However, the
evidence shows that Wright was not a participant in cooking the methamphetamine,
although he did know it was taking place (R. 315: 44; 316: 26-27). Despite the feet that
Judge Brian heard evidence at the rule 23B hearing explaining Wright's limited
participation in this crime, evidence explaining Wright's troubled childhood and how this
affected his life, and the ample positive character evidence regarding Wright's life
history, Judge Brian declared "this was as clear a state-penitentiary case as I've seen" (R.
316:34).
Wright asserts that these statements show that Judge Brian's testimony is
undoubtedly relevant, although not dispositive of, the question of whether he would have
received a more favorable sentence but for trial counsel's deficient performance.
Moreover, the case law previously cited to is also on point, showing that judges are
required to consider all the evidence, mitigating and aggravating, when imposing
sentence. Otherwise, there would be no point to a sentencing hearing if the mitigating
evidence had no effect on the sentence outcome.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Wright asks
this Court to reverse the trial court's sentencing order and remand this case for a new
sentencing hearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of January, 2003.

fargaret B. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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